

MEMORANDUM

To: Interested Parties

From: American Economic Liberties Project

Date: September 21, 2026

Re: The Protect College Sports Act, Myth vs. Fact

A vote on the Protect College Sports Act (“PCSA”) is expected on or about September 22, 2026. We urge members to oppose the bill. The case for its passage rests on a set of claims that the record does not support.

The core of the bill is Section 118, which makes it lawful under the antitrust laws for the NCAA, conferences, and schools to enforce a cap on athlete compensation (Secs. 114–115), eligibility rules (Sec. 113), transfer limits (Sec. 112), recruiting windows (Sec. 117), agent rules (Sec. 103), mid-season coaching restrictions (Sec. 110), and championship selection. Section 118(b) separately immunizes the NCAA from liability for imposing fines, participation bans, and eligibility sanctions that might otherwise violate our antitrust laws. Nothing in the bill caps what a school may pay a coach or an administrator or spend on facilities and travel.

The myths surrounding the PCSA are dispelled below.

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TITLE I – THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTIONS

MYTH #1: An “arms race” for college athletes created the financial crisis in college athletics.

FACT: The spending that created the financial crisis for college athletics began before schools were permitted to pay athletes. Spending on coaches, staff, and buildings is driving the arms race.

A memo circulated by Senator Maria Cantwell argues that “unsustainable athletics spending is amplifying the broader fiscal pressures facing higher education.”¹ The Government Accountability Office report she relies on looks at financial data from 2014 to 2024, before schools began sharing any revenue with athletes.² During that time frame, Division I spending on coaches grew faster than spending on athlete scholarships. Increased travel costs, which the GAO identifies as the largest component of the “team and game expense” category, rose across every subdivision.³

Coaching buyouts are also a huge source of spending.⁴ In the 2025 cycle, 15 fired FBS head coaches were owed over \$200 million, led by \$54 million at LSU, \$38 million at Kentucky, and \$33.5 million at Michigan State.⁵ That is money paid to coaches who were fired (and possibly coaching a rival team), at schools cutting academic programs and raising student fees.

The PCSA does not cap coaches’ salaries, administrators’ salaries, travel expenses, or facilities spending. It only caps players’ compensation. As a result, the arms race will continue but the money will flow to everyone but the athletes.

MYTH #2: The bill relieves financial pressure on colleges.

FACT: It raises the ceiling on athlete spending, adds new mandates at Division I schools, and leaves every other cost untouched.

The PCSA roughly doubles the athlete compensation cap that already exists. The *House* settlement caps revenue sharing at about \$20.5 million per school. Section 114 adds a retention

¹ Office of U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell, [*Unsustainable Growth in Spending for Sports Amplifies Broader Financial Pressure on Colleges and Universities: How the Athletics Arms Race Is Shifting Costs Onto Universities, Students, and Taxpayers*](#), U.S. SENATE, at 1 (Sept. 15, 2026).

² *Id.* at 1 n.1. Prior to the 2025–2026 athletic season, the NCAA prohibited schools from making any direct payments, beyond scholarships and education-related benefits, to athletes. The *House* settlement required a change in that rule, and schools can now share up to \$20.5 million of athletic department revenue with their athletes.

³ U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, [*College Athletics: Most Programs Spend More Than They Generate in Revenue*](#), GAO-26-108640, at 4 (July 14, 2026).

⁴ Buyouts are contractual guarantees of future pay when a coach is fired without cause.

⁵ Knight Comm’n on Intercollegiate Athletics, [*FBS Football Coaching Severance: Symptom of Broken Financial Framework*](#), at 4–5 (Dec. 31, 2025).

fund of up to \$22.5 million per year,⁶ plus up to \$5 million more tied to non-revenue sports, bringing the total to roughly \$48 million. Schools that claim athlete pay is bankrupting them are asking Congress for permission to spend more than twice as much. And the current cap is not restraining the schools at the top. Ohio State, Oregon, Texas, LSU, Texas A&M, and Miami reportedly paid athletes between \$44 and \$54 million last year.⁷

The bill furthermore imposes entirely *new* costs on Division I schools, including the ones that share no revenue with athletes at all:

- **Medical (Sec. 106).** Out-of-pocket expenses for athletics injuries, independent second opinions, catastrophic injury insurance above \$90,000, an end-of-college physical, and coverage that continues after eligibility ends.
- **Personnel (Secs. 107–108).** An athletic health and safety officer at every institution, independent of the athletic department and reporting outside it, plus compliance with concussion, heat illness, rhabdomyolysis, sickle cell trait, and asthma protocols.
- **Scholarships and rosters (Sec. 125).** Large institutions must maintain their 2024–25 grant-in-aid opportunities and roster spots in non-revenue sports, regardless of what happens to their revenue, unless they obtain a waiver.
- **Facilities and services (Sec. 109).** Comparable standards of access to facilities, services, and events.
- **Reporting (Secs. 103–104).** Annual disclosure of every NIL agreement's services and compensation, program-by-program revenues and expenditures including personnel pay, athlete time demands, and academic outcomes, plus an agent registry.
- **Litigation exposure (Sec. 119).** A private right of action covering those obligations, with no pre-dispute arbitration available to the school.

These are protections athletes should enjoy, but they are also mandates with price tags, landing hardest on the schools with the smallest budgets, in a bill whose stated purpose is to relieve financial pressure on colleges. Again, the only spending the bill actually restricts is the money that goes to athletes.

⁶ This is money schools can pay to athletes who have completed a season there, over and above the cap, ostensibly to stop other schools from successfully recruiting them.

⁷ Stewart Mandel, [Cap? What cap? How college football programs blow past player spending limits](#), New York Times (Sept. 17, 2026).

MYTH #3: Litigation has made college sports ungovernable, so Congress must step in.

FACT: The only reason athletes have any of the rights the bill claims to protect is because of litigation. The litigation – and the results of it – are occurring because antitrust laws are working.

The lawsuits against the NCAA are ordinary Sherman Act enforcement efforts against conduct a unanimous Supreme Court has already condemned. In *NCAA v. Alston*, the Court described the case as one involving admitted horizontal price fixing by defendants with monopoly control. It rejected the NCAA's request for antitrust immunity outright. What followed — the *House* settlement, the consent decree with the Justice Department ending the sit-out transfer rule in *Ohio v. NCAA*, the *Pavia* decision on junior college eligibility, the *Brentmeier* settlement on tennis prize money, the junior hockey class action, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' framework in *Johnson v. NCAA* — is what enforcement looks like after decades of unlawful conduct.

The NCAA and its members have used their market power against athletes, coaches, and schools for decades.⁸ When the Supreme Court found their rules against athlete compensation anticompetitive and illegal, athletic departments did not adjust their budgets to account for the new expense. Instead, they layered it on top of their already profligate spending. The PCSA is not a congressional remedy for a governance gap. It is a bailout, to save the NCAA from a crisis of its own creation, just like Wall Street asked for a bailout when its reckless investment strategies brought on the 2008 financial crisis.

MYTH #4: The NCAA needs a new antitrust exemption to set compensation, transfer, and eligibility rules.

FACT: An exemption for sports leagues already exists. The price of admission is bargaining with the athletes.

Nearly every professional league in America enforces a salary cap, age and eligibility rules, transfer and free agency restrictions, and anti-circumvention rules. None of it violates the Sherman Act, because existing statutory and non-statutory labor exemptions permit the process. These exemptions allow management and players' unions to agree to these things through collective bargaining.

The NCAA wants the same protection without the bargaining. That is a different thing entirely, and it is why this exemption is unusual. Antitrust exemptions are, as a rule, disfavored and strictly limited, and the major exemptions correct power imbalances rather than entrench them.

⁸ See, e.g., *NCAA v. Board of Regents*, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (restricting universities' ability to negotiate television contracts); *Johnson v. NCAA*, 108 F.4th 163 (3d Cir. 2024) (affirming that amateurism does not automatically exclude college athletes from FLSA protections); *Law v. NCAA*, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998) (artificially capping assistant coaches' salaries at near poverty levels); *House v. NCAA*, No. 4:20-cv-03919-CW (N.D. Cal. filed June 15, 2020) (challenging NCAA bans on athlete compensation); *Smart v. NCAA*, No. 23-cv-00425, 2023 WL 4827366 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 2023) (settling another antitrust challenge to volunteer coaching salaries capped at \$0).

The labor exemptions let workers act together against a large employer. Capper-Volstead lets farmers pool together to negotiate with processors. And so on.

The PCSA goes the other direction. It lets the buyers of athletic labor agree among themselves on what that labor is worth, with no negotiation and no athlete consent. The only comparable exemption in American sports is Major League Baseball's, which is a 1922 judicial error the Supreme Court has itself called an aberration. MLB used it to hold minor league salaries at \$15,000 a year and require unpaid attendance at spring training. Those players' circumstances changed only when they were able to unionize.

MYTH #5: Collective bargaining is impossible in college sports.

FACT: Athletes are organizing right now, through two different routes, and the PCSA has arrived just in time to make the outcome irrelevant.

- **Conference-level bargaining.** Stanford football players formed the first player-led chapter of the College Football Players Association, with the stated goal of bargaining with the ACC as other teams in the conference join them.⁹ Conferences are plausible bargaining partners.
- **State labor law.** Oregon State women's basketball players petitioned the Oregon Employment Relations Board in the first union effort built entirely on a state public-employee bargaining law. Ten of the team's 13 current players signed cards. The hearing opened in Salem on September 14, the day before the Senate voted to proceed to this bill.¹⁰
- **A national players association.** More than 100 women's basketball players across programs have signed union cards with the United College Athletes Association.¹¹
- **States move quickly when their schools' athletic fortunes are at stake.** California passed the first law protecting NIL rights in 2019, and over 30 state legislatures have followed suit in the ensuing 7 years.¹² States can do the same for any college athletes at public universities who might otherwise be covered by laws prohibiting public-employee bargaining. In fact, several already have laws allowing for collective bargaining by other non-employee workers.
- **A federal model already exists.** The College Athlete Right to Organize Act (S. 2469), introduced by Senators Chris Murphy, Bernie Sanders, and

⁹ Dan Murphy, [Stanford football players join push for collective bargaining](#), ESPN (July 27, 2026).

¹⁰ Mitchell Northam, [Oregon hearing could decide if women's college basketball players can unionize](#), USA TODAY (Sept. 14, 2026).

¹¹ Justin Williams, [Over 100 women's college basketball players join push to unionize](#), THE ATHLETIC (July 21, 2026).

¹² Troutman Pepper Locke, [State + Federal Legislation Tracker](#) (July 17, 2025).

Elizabeth Warren and Rep. Summer Lee, treats public institutions as employers for intercollegiate athletics regardless of contrary state law, and lets athletes organize by sport, across sports, or conference-wide.¹³ It is endorsed by the MLB, MLS, NBA, NFL, and NHL players' associations.

The PCSA forecloses what these efforts could produce. Under Section 114(a)(1)(A), no institution may agree to compensation that exceeds the revenue share cap — including, on its face, compensation agreed to in a collective bargaining agreement. Section 121(a) separately preempts state laws that regulate NIL compensation, transfers, or eligibility, and the savings clause in Section 121(b) does not save state labor laws.

MYTH #6: Athletes aren't interested in employment status or unions.

FACT: Both sides of this debate can produce athletes who agree with them. Only one is willing to let athletes vote on the issue.

Athletes disagree with each other about employment status, as workers in any industry do. Labor law resolves that disagreement the same way everywhere: workers sign cards, they vote, and if a majority rejects the campaign, there is no union. The PCSA skips this step. It unilaterally settles the compensation, transfer, and eligibility terms for every college athlete in the country at once, and it immunizes the rules and anticompetitive results from challenge.

Section 111's requirement that one-third of governing boards be current or recent athletes is not a substitute for this process. Those seats are filled through the NCAA's own processes. Athletes do not elect them, and they cannot change the compensation, eligibility, and transfer rules the PCSA would codify.

MYTH #7: Section 122's neutrality language keeps the employment question open.

FACT: The rest of the PCSA nullifies Section 122.

Section 122 says the PCSA does nothing to alter employee or non-employee status. But employment status matters because employees can organize, bargain, and enforce an agreement. The bill removes the subject matter of that bargaining before the question is answered.

If a court applying the Third Circuit's economic realities test in *Johnson v. NCAA* finds that athletes are employees, those employees would sit across the table from an employer that is immune from antitrust liability for setting their compensation, and barred from paying more than the statutory cap even if it wanted to. There is nothing left to negotiate over, and no leverage with which to negotiate.

¹³ Press Release, As Trump, [Congressional Republicans Side With NCAA Bosses, Murphy, Sanders, Warren Reintroduce Legislation to Strengthen College Athletes' Collective Bargaining Rights](#) (July 24, 2025).

The practical effect of Sections 114, 115, 118, and 121 together is to codify an employment contract for 500,000 college athletes into U.S. law and set all of the economic terms of their participation in college sports.

MYTH #8: The PCSA gives athletes historic protections.

FACT: Athletes get vague terms written by Congress that the NCAA and the schools define and that athletes cannot renegotiate or enforce.

Athletes need significant protections, given the enormous pressure and risk they face. The problem is the structure around the protections created by the PCSA.

- **The NCAA and schools write the standards they must meet.** Section 107(a) defines the required health standards by reference to the NCAA's own concussion, rhabdomyolysis, and sickle cell trait protocols, as the NCAA amends them.
- **The economic terms are not realistically enforceable by athletes.** Section 119(a) permits suits over Sections 101, 104 through 109, 111 through 113, and 114(b). However, unlike the Sherman and Clayton Acts, it does not award treble damages, and attorneys' fees are at the discretion of the court.¹⁴ It does not permit an athlete to sue over Section 114's cap or Section 115. A denied NIL deal is not actionable.
- **The terms expire on Congress's schedule, not the parties'.** The retention fund sunsets after nine years (Sec. 114(a)(2)(C)), and under Section 115 the cap continues past the settlement only if Congress passes a joint resolution of approval, with a formula of 4 percent annual increases and recalculation at 22 percent of average shared revenue every third year.
- **Nothing can be traded.** In collective bargaining, athletes could accept a lower cap in exchange for better medical coverage, or agree to less pay in exchange for longer eligibility windows. Under this bill, no such trade is available to them or the schools, at any price. The ceiling and the floor are both statutory.

MYTH #9: The bill protects small schools and women's and Olympic sports.

FACT: The protections are conditional, unfunded, or temporary. The immunity is none of those things.

- **Championship access.** Section 118(a)(7) immunizes the rules that determine which institutions are selected for championships and tournaments. The NCAA can decide, free of antitrust review, which schools play in the College

¹⁴ See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (mandating treble damages and attorneys' fee awards for prevailing plaintiffs in antitrust lawsuits).

Football Playoff, March Madness, and the College World Series. Smaller programs will have no recourse if they are unilaterally excluded, whatever the reason.

- **The cap is calibrated to the richest schools.** The revenue share cap is set at 22 percent of average shared revenue at the highest-earning programs, and Section 114 allows a further \$22.5 million retention fund and \$5 million for non-revenue sports on top of it. That is roughly \$48 million per school. Only a few dozen athletic departments can reach it. For everyone else, a ceiling pegged to the Big Ten and SEC's revenue is a number they will never approach, while their competitors are guaranteed the legal right to spend it. The gap between what big and small programs are capable of spending will widen every year.
- **Roster and scholarship floors.** Section 125(b) requires large institutions to maintain the grant-in-aid opportunities and roster spots they offered in the 2024–25 season for non-revenue sports, but an association may waive the requirement a year at a time for a 15 percent revenue decline, for compliance with federal law, or for financial hardship. The floor obligates no one to spend anything on these programs.
- **The non-revenue add-on.** Section 114(a)(2)(B) lets a school exceed the cap by up to \$5 million more, in proportion to what it chooses to pay athletes in non-revenue sports. It is permissive, it rewards schools that were already paying those athletes, and it expires with the retention fund after nine years.
- **What is not addressed at all.** GAO reports that 87 percent of non-Power FBS schools and 48 percent of Power schools charge all students a mandatory athletics fee. James Madison charges \$3,011 a year, which funds roughly three-quarters of its athletics budget. The bill does nothing about the fees, the subsidies, or the debts that are actually straining smaller programs.

MYTH #10: The College Sports Commission and NIL Go are ordinary compliance tools.

FACT: The bill codifies and immunizes a centralized, algorithmic system for setting the price of athlete labor, at the same moment courts and enforcers are scrutinizing exactly this conduct in other industries.

The College Sports Commission, working with Deloitte, runs NIL Go, which screens third-party deals for a “valid business purpose” and a compensation level the system deems reasonable. Athletes who proceed with a rejected deal risk their eligibility.

What the bill does with that system:

- **It writes an NIL standard into law without defining it.** Section 114(a)(1)(B) requires NIL agreements to be for a valid business purpose and commensurate with compensation paid to individuals of similar profile,

reputation, or notability who are not athletes at the institution. These benchmarks are vague, and the entity applying them will control how they are interpreted.

- **It immunizes the enforcer.** Section 118(d) lets the NCAA or a conference designate an entity under its control — currently the CSC — that will enforce Section 114 with immunity.
- **It gives the cartel, not the athletes, notice and comment.** Under Section 118(d)(2), when the CSC issues guidance, it must give notice and an opportunity to comment to the *defendant parties* in the *House* litigation: the NCAA, the conferences, and the schools. Athletes get no such right.
- **It builds the data layer.** Section 104 requires athletes and institutions to report deal descriptions and compensation amounts, and requires the NCAA to maintain a public, searchable database of that data.

The Justice Department’s *RealPage* case and the related litigation over rental and hotel pricing software turned on competitors feeding nonpublic, competitively sensitive pricing data into a shared tool that then sets the price. The DOJ’s *RealPage* settlement bars the use of nonpublic competitor data in the algorithm.

Here, the publication of competitor data is mandatory, the output governs an athlete’s eligibility to play, and the agreements among schools and conferences to abide by it are explicit and public.¹⁵ The public database will enable schools, advertisers, and other NIL partners to build algorithms that suppress athlete pay, the same way RealPage allegedly used data to inflate the cost of rental housing.

TITLE II – THE SPORTS BROADCASTING ACT

MYTH #11: Pooling college media rights will generate billions and make athletic departments self-sustaining.

FACT: There is no public evidence that this sum is accurate, and no mechanism requiring any of it to reach the programs it is supposed to save.

The origin of the \$4 to \$8 billion figure circulating in support of Title II is murky at best and has no published source or methodology behind it. The premise is that conferences are leaving money on the table, but the Power Four are not under-monetized. Conferences already sell across broadcast, cable, satellite, streaming, and direct-to-consumer. The SEC’s deal with ESPN runs 10 years and \$3 billion, the Big Ten’s with Fox and NBC is 7 years and \$7 billion, the Big 12’s with ESPN and Fox is 6 years and \$2.3 billion, and the NCAA’s March Madness deal with CBS is \$800 million.

¹⁵ For a full analysis, see Sam C. Ehrlich, Katherine Van Dyck & Tyler Phillips, *Potential Antitrust Issues with NIL Go’s Algorithmic Determinations of NIL “Fair Market Value”*, 51 J. College & Univ. L. 89 (2026).

Even if pooling produced new revenue, nothing in Title II directs it anywhere. There is no allocation formula, no audit, and no enforcement mechanism tying a dollar of it to women's or Olympic sports. And the pooling entity requires agreement among at least 75 percent of the 138 FBS institutions. That threshold cannot be reached without the Big Ten and SEC's participation. They have no reason to subsidize their competitors and have not committed to join.

MYTH #12: Extending the Sports Broadcasting Act to college sports gives college athletics the same deal professional leagues have had since 1961.

FACT: That deal is under active investigation by the Justice Department, the FCC, and Congress, because of the consumer harms it produces. The PCSA would expand it anyway.

In 1961, the Sports Broadcasting Act was sold to Congress as a narrow law only covering free over-the-air broadcasts. NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle assured Congress it would not apply to pay television, and courts have held that line, including the Third Circuit in 1999 and the Ninth Circuit on cable and satellite in 2019. But the exemption has never been changed to adapt to modern media. As a result, it produces a market for televised NFL games in which fans pay upwards of \$1,000 a season, because the only way to view every game played by a particular team is to sign up for multiple streaming subscriptions.¹⁶

Disney, Fox, and Warner Brothers control the vast majority of sports broadcasting. They pass the cost of acquiring those broadcasting rights onto cable, satellite, and streaming companies in the form of affiliate fees. Those fees are passed on to subscribers, whether they watch sports or not. This is, in many cases, in addition to the fees fans pay to stream particular games. Folks in Washington, D.C. have spent the past year examining that record. House Judiciary opened an investigation into league broadcasting practices in August 2025, released an interim staff report in June 2026 titled "The Sports Broadcasting Act: A Special-Interest Antitrust Exemption Gone Awry," and held a hearing on June 10, 2026. The NFL declined to send a witness.

Senator Mike Lee, chair of the Senate Judiciary antitrust subcommittee, wrote to the Justice Department and the FTC in March 2026 asking them to examine whether the NFL's streaming distribution is consistent with the exemption.

The Justice Department opened an investigation in April 2026.

The FCC opened an inquiry into whether the exemption remains justified and received over 8,000 comments, almost entirely from frustrated fans.¹⁷

Senator Cruz framed the test himself at the Senate Commerce Committee's "Field of Streams" hearing in May 2025: if the leagues could show that the SBA continues to benefit fans, it might be worth exploring a similar exemption for college sports.¹⁸ In the sixteen months since, the

¹⁶ Ryan Bass, [It costs \\$1,000+ to watch an NFL season on cable, streaming](#), YAHOO! SPORTS (Apr. 10, 2026).

¹⁷ Ryan Gaydos, [FCC commissioner backs frustrated American sports fans as leagues pivot to streaming services](#), FOX NEWS (Apr. 21, 2026).

¹⁸ Press Release, [Sen. Cruz: Streaming May Be the Future — But It Shouldn't Sideline Sports Fans](#), U.S. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSP. (May 6, 2025).

evidence has only indicted the statute. And there is no evidence that expanding the SBA to college sports would have a different outcome.

Congress should not extend a 65-year-old exemption to a new industry while three separate federal bodies are investigating whether the old version has any merit at all.

MYTH #13: The local broadcast mandate protects fans.

FACT: It is unworkable as drafted, and it does not change the fact that one seller would control every national deal.

Section 204 requires football and basketball games to be available on a freely viewable outlet in the school's home market, and in one additional in-state or adjacent market where a substantial portion of alumni, students, or residents live. Texas has 20 designated market areas and alumni in all of them. Nothing in the bill says how the University of Texas or its broadcast partner would choose the second market, and nothing prevents that choice from being steered by the special interests of local and state officials, donors, and local broadcasters seeking guaranteed inventory.

Meanwhile the underlying harm is not addressed. Fans are already forced to piece together access to games from a stack of subscriptions, and ESPN's affiliate fees alone exceed \$9 per subscriber per month, several times that of any other broadcaster. Title II adds another entity with antitrust immunity negotiating national, regional, and local rights. Free local games do not offset a single seller setting this national price.

MYTH #14: The bill stops the Big Ten and SEC from swallowing college football.

FACT: The restraint is temporary and dissolves precisely when the next wave of realignment becomes possible.

Section 205 bars a conference reporting more than \$700 million in revenue from acquiring schools that have recently competed in such a conference, and caps other acquisitions at 19 members. There is reporting that the independence period is being shortened from five years to three, and the waiting period sunsets entirely after six years.

The Big Ten and SEC deals will expire between 2030 and 2034.¹⁹ The provision does not prevent consolidation. It defers it to the next television cycle and then disappears, after the compensation cap has had six years to separate the highest-spending programs from everyone else.

¹⁹ Ralph D. Russo, [BIG deal: Big Ten lands \\$7 billion, NFL-style TV contracts](#), ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 18, 2022); Kevin Draper and Alan Blinder, [SEC Reaches \\$3 Billion Deal With Disney, Drawing CBS Ties Toward an End](#), NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 10, 2020).

TITLE III – THE HBCUs

MYTH #15: The PCSA will bring much needed funding to HBCUs.

FACT: Title III is an ephemeral promise that creates perpetual lobbying fights and no guaranteed money.

Section 307 authorizes \$180 million per year for fiscal years 2027 through 2032 for the Title III program. An authorization is not an appropriation. HBCUs would have to win that money in every annual funding cycle, while Section 118's immunity takes effect on enactment and never expires.

THE BOTTOM LINE

Opposition to this bill is not an argument against compensation, transfer, and eligibility rules. It is an argument against setting those rules unilaterally, with no seat at the table for the athletes the rules govern.

In every other major American sports league, these rules are bargained between management and the players. The NCAA has blocked that path for a century, and it is now asking Congress to protect it from the fallout. The PCSA would settle the major economic terms of 500,000 athletes' participation through a legislative process they had no seat in, lock those terms behind statutory immunity, and leave them changeable only by an act of Congress. We urge members to vote “nay.”