This Court found that Google unlawfully monopolized the general search services and general search text advertising markets. In the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, “the Government in its effort to free [these markets] of monopoly and unreasonable restraints … ha[s] won the battle.” Int’l Boxing Club of N. Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 259 (1959). It is now the “inescapable responsibility” and “duty” of this Court to “prescribe relief which will terminate the illegal monopoly, deny [Google] the fruits of its statutory violation, and ensure that there remain no practices likely to result in monopolization in the future.” United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250 (1968). In so doing, and because “the Government has successfully borne the considerable burden of establishing a violation of law, all doubts as to the remedy are to be resolved in its favor.” United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 334 (1961). If this Court, at Google’s urging, and relying virtually exclusively on statements in a set of D.C. Circuit and district court opinions in a single case (Microsoft), stops short of achieving these U.S. Supreme Court-mandated objectives, the American public, who has been waiting far too long for a vibrant, competitive market, will have “won the battle but lost the war.” Int’l Boxing Club, 358 U.S. at 259.

Google offers three reasons why this Court should stop short of fully achieving the remedial objectives required by the U.S. Supreme Court. First, Google argues—relying on dicta from the Microsoft case—that the Court’s remedy must be of the same “type or class” as the conduct the Court found anticompetitive. Second, Google argues—again relying not on U.S. Supreme Court precedent but on Microsoft dicta—that the Government must prove a “significant causal connection between the conduct and creation or maintenance of the market power” for the Court to order structural relief. Third, Google argues that structural relief is not available in a case where the defendant “merely” unlawfully maintains—as opposed to acquires—monopoly power.

All of Google’s arguments fail under longstanding U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which provides that upon a finding of a violation of Section 2, the court must do more than simply enjoin future violations; it must put an end to the monopolizing conduct, “assure the complete extirpation of the illegal monopoly,” and deprive the defendant of the fruits of its unlawful restraints. United Shoe, 391 U.S. at 247. This Court has recently expressed concerns that the remedies under discussion in this case may not go nearly far enough—that they may merely turn Google’s monopoly into a duopoly of Google and Microsoft, the only other corporation with a war chest big enough to meaningfully vie for default or exclusive positioning. The Court is right to be concerned. We must avoid another United Shoe, in which the defendant, arguing—like Google does—that it “owed much of its position to superior products and services,” convinced the trial court to refrain from ordering meaningful relief, including divestiture. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 266 F. Supp. 328, 330 (D. Mass. 1967), rev’d, 391 U.S. 244 (1968). Ten years later, the defendant “continued to dominate the shoe machinery market” and “workable competition had not been established,” requiring a stern intervention by the Supreme Court that finally led to a breakup of the company. United Shoe, 391 U.S. at 247. The American public cannot afford a similar mistake here.